Book Review: Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher

I started off the New Year by getting back to reading about my favorite topic, the Civil War, after having read little in this area since September. I tackled first a book that I've wanted to read ever since I first saw it on the shelf a few years ago. There's something about a book titled "Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher" that is guaranteed to draw in a Grant enthusiast like myself. I'll admit I was eager to see one of my personal heroes acquitted of the title that he earned post-war when people looked back on charges like the second attack on the Vicksburg trenches or the poorly-executed attempt to break Robert E. Lee's lines at Cold Harbor. What I read didn't disappoint me; after finishing Bonekemper's book, I was left with a personal hero smelling perhaps a bit too much look roses...

Review

Bonekemper III, Edward H. Ulysses S. Grant: A Victor, Not a Butcher. Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2004. 453p. Photographs, bibliography, maps, index. ISBN: 9781596986411.


The thesis of this work is clearly stated in the title: to marshal evidence to dispel the persistent belief among the American public that Ulysses S. Grant, the general who led the Union forces to victory in the US Civil War, was an unskilled general whose poor leadership led to the needless sacrifice of thousands of soldiers. This view is generally contrasted with a far more flattering assessment of his opponent, Robert E. Lee, who is seen as a brilliant tactician. Bonekemper (military historian at Muhlenberg College, PA) uses a wide array of statistical information and extensive research of both period documents and modern histories to describe how the "butcher" myth came about and to thoroughly refute it. His treatment demonstrates clearly that Grant's casualty rates were comparable to other generals throughout the war, that he used tactics and maneuver much more often than brute force when facing an opponent army, and that his results were exceptional, including the capture of multiple opposing armies and the forced surrender of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, which brought an effective end to the combat of the Civil War.

This is a solid piece of scholarship, aimed at a lay reader, and therefore treats most topics as if the reader knows little about them. It is written in an engaging and flowing style that draws the reader in, and Bonekemper makes each of his points in support of Grant with a flourish of style and wit. However, it is difficult not to notice that, in Bonekemper's assessment, Grant never does wrong; every decision is thoroughly defended and Grant is acquitted on all counts. It is easy to finish this work convinced that Grant hardly made a wrong step the whole war; even the disastrous first day at Shiloh is quickly explained away as not Grant's fault, while he receives full credit for the turn-around in Union fortunes the next day. In his effort to convince the reader that Grant is not, in fact, a butcher, Bonekemper at times loses sight that Grant did still make mistakes.

For a thorough re-assessment of the generalship of Ulysses S. Grant, taking in to account both the analyses of his contemporaries and the scholarship of prominent historians from the past 150 years, Bonekemper's work is excellent and readable. However, it is a work that is best read with an understanding that Bonekemper has an agenda, and has white-washed or hurried past (though not ignored!) information that would interfere with that agenda.

Rating: 4 out of 5